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Abstract 
The baseline model of international tax competition predicts that domestic income 
inequality will increase: in the worst case progressive taxation on capital is no longer 
possible and spending levels deteriorate.  Given that the median voter is receiving her 
income mostly from labor, many observers are puzzled that corporate tax competition 
persists among developed democracies. Even during the economic crisis, hard-hit 
countries such as Ireland insisted to keep their low corporate tax rate despite pressure 
from other European countries and with a broad backing of the whole political 
spectrum. Why do left-wing parties not intervene and call for international tax 
harmonization if tax competition is detrimental for the poor?  It is the aim of this paper 
to explain the driving forces of tax competition and their consequences on inequality. 
Specifically, we shed light on why the poor and their representatives in smaller 
economies have not done much against tax competition. To do so we first build a 
theoretical model based on asymmetric tax competition in two countries, which we then 
test empirically. In our model the median voter in both countries is poor; thus the left 
determines the domestic capital tax rate. Nevertheless, in equilibrium tax competition 
persists. We show that the rich and the poor of the small country can achieve a higher 
net income when engaging in international tax competition. This explains why tax 
competition is politically robust even in a model where the rich have no power over the 
tax rate. We test the empirical implications of our model against a sample of eight OECD 
countries and their tax policies over a long time frame from 1960 until today. In 
conclusion, we discuss the crucial implication from accepting a lower capital tax rate, 





The lack of harmonization of tax policies in Europe combined with the freedom 
of capital movement is causing downward tax competition or "tax dumping". 
One member state's tax cuts can indeed result in another's' public service cuts. 
European rules need to be adopted regarding taxes which directly, affect (...) 
other member states behavior - such as taxes on interests from capital and 
corporate taxes." (ETUC 1995, 17) 
 
At times of international capital mobility, governments can lure international 
investments by offering lower capital taxes than competing states. This behavior 
triggers a race-to-the-bottom, in which states undercut each other leading to no or at 
best, lower capital taxes than under before. According to the baseline model, capital tax 
competition has one of two potential welfare effects. Either it decreases government 
revenue, which could be used for redistribution to the poor, or the tax burden is shifted 
to less mobile bases such as labor income. In any case, the overall welfare effect on 
income inequality is negative. Nevertheless despite almost twenty years of calls for tax 
harmonization at the European (if not global) level, not even a minimum corporate tax 
rate exists. Is there a corporate conspiracy (ICFTU 2006, 37) or why can democratically 
elected governments not agree on a common policy that allegedly improves the welfare 
of the majority of their voters? 
The answer, we argue, is that structure shapes politics. So far, scholars have either 
argued that globalization puts similar pressure on all governments to become 
competition states (Cerny 1997; Jessop 2002) or that structural pressures are in fact not 
as strong as they appear: there “remains a leftist alternative to free market capitalism in 
the era of global markets based on classic ‘big government’ and corporatist principles” 
(Garrett 1998: 4). With regards to international tax competition, we argue that none of 
them is right. Rather, the demand for the ‘leftist alternative’ is conditioned by the 
structural position in the world economy. Contrary to the belief that left-wing parties 
are always in favor of raising capital taxes, many of them in fact support international 
tax competition. For instance, the Irish Labour Party implemented the corporate tax cut 
from 32 to 12.5 percent in the early 2000. Furthermore, they even insisted that it 
remained in place following the economic crisis when the government was pressured 
for public finance (Labour 2011). So, when do left-wing parties support international tax 
competition? 
The answer comes from the asymmetric model of tax competition, which suggests that 
the incentives to compete vary with country size (Keen and Konrad 2012, 2013; Wilson 
1999). Small states can gain from tax competition: Poaching foreign tax base is 
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potentially welfare-enhancing for them. Large states, by contrast, lose in welfare terms. 
They are better off farming domestic tax resources. Accordingly, small countries are 
more likely to engage in aggressive tax competition than large ones. Figure 1 illustrates 
this by drawing the corporate tax rates weighted and unweighted by population.  We 
argue that the globalization literature has not taken this argument seriously enough. The 
different welfare outcomes associated with asymmetric tax competition make the size of 
an economy not something to be additionally controlled for, but an integral part for all 
models of partisan tax policy choice. 
 
Figure 1: Corporate Tax Rates in the OECD, 1980-2010 
 
In our paper, we combine the public finance and globalization literature and show that 
political preferences are not independent of structural conditions. It is not only size that 
matters, but party politics matter for tax competition as well. Yet, we argue that party 
politics only matter in large countries. Here, left-wing governments attempt to keep up 
the capital tax rate to use the revenue for redistribution. By contrast, in smaller 
countries left-wing governments support competitive tax cuts as their constituency 
actually benefits from international tax competition. By having lower capital taxes then 
their large neighbors, they can lure international investments. This leads to a more 
flourishing economy, from which also people without capital income gain via increased 
employment opportunities and higher wages. Although the poor of the small country 
gain in terms of net income and thus drive international tax competition (or at least 
hinder harmonization), this comes at a high cost: both domestic and international 
inequality increase.  
4 
 
The paper is structured as follows: The next part provides a brief literature review on 
international tax competition. Following the review, we present our theoretical model, 
which includes two countries (big and small), two classes (rich and poor), and two types 
of income (capital and labor). The median voter is poor and sets the capital tax rate. The 
model shows that political preferences are highly dependent on structural conditions. 
The fact, that party politics is only effective in large countries, has surprising results for 
income levels and equality, which are not usually thought of when discussing 
international tax competition. Contrary to the general assumption that the poor should 
be in favor of taxing capital at a high rate to use the income for redistribution, we show 
that the poor in the small country can be in favor of lower capital tax rates under tax 
competition as they achieve a higher net income. In section 3 we test our argument 
based on self-collected data for the corporate tax choices of four small and four large 
countries from 1960 to 2011. Moreover, we briefly look at the implications of the model: 
has domestic and international inequality really increased since capital market 
liberalization? Finally, in section 4, we conclude. 
2. Tax Competition: A Literature Review 
While the economic literature on tax competition is extensive (see Genschel and 
Schwarz 2011; Keen and Konrad 2012, for recent reviews), most of it starts from the 
same baseline model. In its simplest form, this model is about two identical countries 
sharing one internationally mobile tax base, capital (Wilson 1999; Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski 1986). The tax policies of both countries are interdependent because one 
country’s capital tax revenue depends on the other country’s capital tax rate: higher 
taxes in country A swell country B’s revenues by pushing a larger share of mobile capital 
towards B; lower taxes in A depress B’s revenues by poaching capital from B. This 
interdependency triggers a ‘race to the bottom’ in taxation as each country tries to 
attract capital from the other. In equilibrium, capital taxes no longer exist.  
This first model triggered strong reactions among policy makers and scholars alike who 
envisioned the end of public good provisions and redistribution together with the end of 
capital taxation. Yet, as some time went by, scholars realized that capital tax rates such 
as corporate tax rates depicted in figure 1 might be declining, but were still far from zero 
and also still very diverse across the OECD. This led to a range of modifications of the 
baseline model, both by public finance scholars as well as by political economists.   
The perhaps most important extension by economists concerns the influence of country 
size (Bucovetsky 1991; Kanbur and Keen 1993) In a symmetric setting of same-sized 
countries, the baseline model predicts that country A and B face the same incentives to 
cut taxes and suffer equal welfare losses in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In an 
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asymmetric setting, however, the smaller country faces stronger incentives to cut tax 
rates than the larger country and suffers a smaller welfare-loss in the competitive 
equilibrium. Indeed, if the difference in country size is large enough, the smaller country 
is better off under tax competition than in its absence. There is a structural “advantage 
of ‘smallness’” (Wilson 1999, 288) in tax competition. Smaller countries gain more from 
lower corporate tax rates. This is also reflected in figure 1, which illustrates that once we 
weight the average OECD tax rates by population size (i.e. give more weight to the big 
countries) the downwards trend is slower. Why is small size a competitive advantage? 
Intuitively, in pondering capital tax cuts governments have to weigh the costs in terms of 
lost revenue from domestic capital against the benefits associated with capital inflows 
from the other country. In the small country with a narrow domestic capital tax base and 
lots of foreign capital to attract, the cost-benefit ratio is more likely to be favorable than 
in the large country with lots of domestic capital to lose and little foreign capital to win. 
We will illustrate this more formally in our theoretical section, which is built on these 
models. 
But let’s turn first to the political side of the tax competition story. Whereas public 
finance scholars were concerned with structural factors in the world economy that 
shape tax policy choices, political economists naturally cared more about institutional 
and ideological differences across countries that influence tax policy outcomes (for 
exceptions seeGrazzini and Van Ypersele 2003; Haufler 1997; Persson and Tabellini 
1992). Whereas some are more concerned with the dynamics of tax competition and the 
speed in which it takes place, others argue that there are genuinely different preferences 
at work, which affect the long-term equilibrium. In the first group are scholars who 
emphasize domestic factors such as the number and ideological range of veto players 
(Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; Ganghof 2006), the structure of electoral institutions 
(Hays 2003, 2009), or budget constraints (Ganghof 2000; Genschel 2002; Swank and 
Steinmo 2002), which are found to slow down tax competition. The second group of 
researchers argues that national differences such as in the partisan composition of 
government (Garrett 1998; Garrett and Lange 1991), welfare regimes (Campbell 2005), 
the variety of capitalism (Swank 2013) or equity norms (Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 
2009) shape national responses differently and allow for more capital taxation under 
conditions of capital mobility than the baseline model would seem to suggest. Thus, it is 
politics rather than economic structure, which shape tax policy choices.  
In our model, we bring these two schools together and illustrate that political 
preferences are not independent of structural conditions. We show that party politics 
matter for tax competition, but only in large countries (for similar models in the public 
finance see Gabszewicz and Van Ypersele 1996; Lejour and Verbon 1996). This has 
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surprising results for income levels and equality, which are not usually thought of when 
discussing international tax competition.  
3. A Model of Asymmetric Tax Competition with the Left in Charge 
In the following we present a theoretical model, which is based on the dream-state of 
the international left, namely a world which is solely governed by representatives of the 
poor. Nevertheless, tax competition persists. After discussing the main mechanisms 
behind the model and why poor voters in small countries still prefer tax competition 
over a 100% capital tax under autarky, we systematically show the effect of asymmetric 
tax competition on domestic and international income inequality.  
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that there are only two 
countries 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝐹}, the home (𝐻) and the foreign (𝐹) country, which are completely the 
same except for their population 𝑁. We assume 𝑁𝐻 ≥ 𝑁𝐹 , i.e. the home country is at least 
as "large" as the foreign country. We furthermore normalize 𝑁𝐻 = 1 and 𝑁𝐻 = 𝜙 ≤ 1. 
There are two groups,  𝑗 ∈ {𝑃, 𝑅}, in each country and we call them the poor, 𝑃, and the 
rich, 𝑅, respectively. The poor have only wage income, while the rich have both wage 
income and capital income. Each of them owns one unit of capital, 𝑘 = 1. We assume 
that the poor group has one more resident than the rich and for a large population the 
share of rich and poor are both equal to 0.5. The total capital endowment is thus given 
by ?̅?𝑖 = 0.5𝑁𝑖 and the capital endowment per capita is ?̅?𝑖 = 0.5. 
Both countries produce a homogenous good with the input of capital and labor. Each 
resident supplies the same fixed time of labor, which is normalized to one. The 
production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is quadratic: 
𝑓(𝑘𝑖) = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑘𝑖)𝑘𝑖 , 
where 𝑘𝑖 denotes capital investment per capita in country 𝑖. By assuming perfect 
competition, the gross return to capital 𝑟𝑖 depends negatively on 𝑘𝑖 and the wage rate 
𝑤𝑖 depends positively on 𝑘𝑖 .  Each country levies a unit tax 𝑡𝑖 on invested capital and the 
tax revenue is redistributed to the residents in form of a lump-sum transfer 𝜏𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖𝑘𝑖 . 
The capital tax rate is determined by voting and, according to our assumption, the poor 
decide upon the tax rate.  
If capital is immobile, the capital tax rate would be confiscatory, because the poor would 
choose to tax away all capital income in order to maximize their net income. As a result, 
all residents would have the same net income, no matter if they own capital or not.  
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However, if capital is perfectly mobile, an increase in the capital tax rate will cause 
capital flight to the other country. The equilibrium at the capital market ensures that the 
net return to capital is equalized in both countries:  
𝜌 = 𝑟𝐻 − 𝑡𝐻 = 𝑟𝐹 − 𝑡𝐹 . 
Consequently, for a given tax rate in the foreign country, increasing capital taxation 
reduces domestic capital investment and the net return to capital in both countries. The 
lower capital investment reduces the capital tax base and the wage rate.  We rely on the 
Nash-equilibrium concept: the poor in each country decide upon capital tax rate by 
maximizing their net income, under the consideration of the negative effect of capital 
taxation on domestic capital investment and while taking the capital tax rate in the other 


















From these two equations we can see that if both countries are of the same size, they 
choose the same tax rate and there is no international capital movement. Yet, the 
equilibrium capital tax rate would still be lower than that under autarky. Due to the 
potential threat of capital flight, the poor cannot set the capital tax rate as high as under 
conditions of closed capital markets.  
If the countries differ in size, however, the home country will choose a higher capital tax 
rate than the foreign country. Due to the tax rate difference, the foreign country has a 
higher capital investment per capita than the home country. Moreover, the differences 
between the tax rates and between the capital investments are larger, the smaller the 
foreign country is relative to the home country.  
The impact of capital mobility on income differs between groups and between countries 
due to three effects: the wage, the tax base and the fiscal effect. First, in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, the small country undercuts the large country’s tax rate and 
ends up with a disproportionately large share of the mobile capital tax base (base 
effect). Hence, the tax base in the foreign country expands, while it shrinks in the home 
country. Moreover, the inflow of capital from the large country pushes up the capital-
labor ratio, fuels labor demand and thus leads to higher employment, higher wages and, 
eventually, to higher tax revenues from labor and consumption (wage effect). In this 
way, not only capital profits from tax competition but labor as well – in the small 
country. Whereas the base and the wage effect both describe the influence of 
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international tax competition on market outcomes, the different tax rates have of course 
also an effect on net incomes. Given the lower capital rate under capital mobility, the tax 
system is less able to redistribute income from the rich to the poor (fiscal effect).While 
the wage and the tax base effect differ between countries the fiscal effect varies between 
groups. Table 1 summarizes the different effects, also for the case of symmetric 
countries, where only the fiscal effect matters.   
Table 1: The Effects of Tax Competition on Net Income 
 Wage Effect Tax Base 
Effect 
Fiscal Effect Total Effect 
Symmetric tax competition 
Poor none none - - 
Rich none none + + 
Asymmetric tax competition 
Poor large - - - - 
Poor small + + - +/- 
Rich large - - + +/- 
Rich small + + + + 
 
The impact of capital mobility on income differs between groups and between countries 
due to the three effects described above. Table 1 shows that compared to autarky, the 
poor in the home country always lose from tax competition, while the rich in the foreign 
country always gain. However, the net income of the poor in the small country and of the 
rich in the large country can either increase or decrease depending on the relative 
importance of the different effects. Given that the poor set the tax policy in our model, 
the ambiguous findings for the rich in the large country do not matter for international 
tax competition (or harmonisation). Thus, we need to look at the poor in the small 
country to learn more about the drivers of international tax competition. 
The simulation in figure 2 illustrates that if the country size difference φ is large enough, 
the wage effect and the tax base effect over-compensate the fiscal effect (figure 2). In 
this case, the poor in the small country have a higher net income under tax competition 
than under autarky (where size differences do not matter). This mechanism is what we 
believe drives international tax competition and hinders tax harmonisation efforts 
between democratically elected governments. 
 
Result: If 𝜙 is small enough, the poor in the foreign country have a higher net income 
under capital tax competition than under autarky. Hence, only left governments in larger 
countries differ in their tax policy choices from their right-wing counterparts. 
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Before we test the empirical implications of our model by looking at tax policies of eight 
OECD countries for the last fifty years, we discuss the theoretical implications of our 
model on income inequality. What does our model imply for national and international 
inequality? Although the poor of the small country can achieve a higher net income 
under tax competition than under autarky, tax competition brings about more income 
inequality within and between countries. Under autarky, each resident in either country 
has the same net income. However, under tax competition, income inequality arises due 
to the three income effects (see Table 1). We measure inequality by income difference as 
the share of the income that is lower.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the influence of tax competition on net income inequality between 
groups and countries: first, income inequality between the rich and the poor increases in 
both countries, i.e. the rich have a higher net income than the poor in both the small and 
the large country. Second, both groups in the small country – the poor and the rich – 
have a higher income than the respective income group in the large country. Finally, we 
compare the within-country inequality between the small and the large country. The 
results show that the within-country inequality is lower in the small country because the 
poor in the small country have a higher net income than the poor in the large one. This 
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result is somewhat surprising as the small country has a lower capital tax rate. It might 
also partly explain what our empirical results indicate, namely that the left in the 
smaller countries is less concerned with tax competition and the resulting inequality 
than the left in larger countries. 
 
Table 2: Effect of Tax Competition on Net Income Inequality within and between 
Countries 
Within and Between countries... 
(Compared to autarky) net income 
inequality... 
Rich vs. Poor in large country increases 
Rich vs. Poor  in small country increases 
Poor in small vs. Poor in large country increases 
Rich in small vs. Rich in large country increases 
Small vs. large within-country inequality increases 
 
4. Empirical Implications for Tax Policy Choices 
To test the driving mechanism of our theoretical model, we compare the corporate tax 
decisions made by left- and right-wing governments in small and large countries. As the 
poor from the small country gain from tax competition, we expect that left-wing parties 
are more favourable of corporate tax cuts in small countries than in large ones, where 
the poor lose from engaging in competitive capital tax cuts. Based on a self-coded 
dataset, which involves tax rate and base decisions as well as timing effect of eight 
European countries from 1961 until 2013, we show that party politics only matters in 
larger countries.  After having found empirical evidence for our theoretical mechanism, 
we discuss the implications of our model for national and international inequality by 
looking at gini coefficients and growth rates across the OECD. Inequality seems to have 
risen according to our predictions. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Based on OECD Country Reports, we constructed a database, which captures the 
corporate tax changes of eight European countries since the 1960s. As the four large 
countries, we chose France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom and as the four 
small, we selected Austria, Luxembourg, Ireland and Switzerland. These countries do not 
only represent the largest and smallest European countries, but they also have different 
historical roots with different tax regimes, which allows testing our argument. Although 
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a sample of eight countries is rather small compared to the usual OECD22, we put the 
emphasis on the historical development and the tax decisions over time to gain a 
sufficiently large sample of corporate tax decisions under different administrations.1 
The main advantage of our tax dataset is that it is based on an overarching concept of tax 
policy decisions. Tax policy is not a straightforward concept to measure. With the 
exception of some remarkable research (Jensen and Lindstädt 2012; Mahon 2004), 
scholars often use the tax revenue and not tax decisions as the dependent variable. 
However, tax revenue does not only measure the policy choice as it is also affected by 
economic developments. Besides the tax revenue, scholars also tend to use the tax rate 
as a measurement of policy decisions. Although this is a better indicator than the 
revenue, a tax increase cannot only be achieved by raising the tax rate but also by 
broadening the tax base. Furthermore, as Jensen and Lindstädt (2012) illustrate, tax rate 
changes are often decided by administrations several years before the actual change 
takes place. Given our interest in the political choices, we collected data on tax rate and 
base changes as well as timing effects for four small and four large European countries 
from 1961 to 2013. A further advantage of compiling this data is that it allows us to 
know which government decided upon a corporate tax change. Our data captures when 
a policy change was passed by a government and not when it was implemented (further 
information and the codebook is available upon request)2. Hence, our dependent 
variable is the count of increases and decreases of corporate taxes based on information 
from the OECD country reports. Although it does not provide insights into the amount of 
change, we believe that this count variable is the best measure of tax policy changes, 
especially given our theoretical focus on the political decision-making.  
The main independent variables are country size and government partisanship, as well 
as their interaction. Size is measured in terms of logged population and the data for 
government partisanship is a dummy variable based on the gov_left indicator from the 
Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2014). The variable measures the 
Cabinet composition: social-democratic and other left parties in percentage of total 
cabinet posts, weighted by days. The classification of parties follows (Schmidt 1996). As 
such, ‘left’ denotes social democratic parties and political parties to the left of social 
democrats, ‘right’ involves liberal and conservative parties and ‘centre’ refers to parties 
such as Christian Democratic or Catholic ones. We refer to a government as left, when it 
is dominated or fully controlled by social-democratic parties. Besides size and 
                                                        
1 As graph 1 already suggests, data on OECD corporate tax rates is only available from the 1980s onwards. 
Furthermore, this captures only actual changes in the rate, rather than the political decisions on the whole 
tax system, which also include base changes. 
2 Table 3 provides the corporate tax changes by the year of the OECD country report instead of the year 
the reform was passed. As the correlation coefficient is very high with 0.99, it provides the advantage that 
we have substantially more observations. 
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government partisanship, we also control for a number of other variables such as the 
debt level, unemployment and gdp growth. All data for the controls stem from the 
Comparative Political Dataset.  
We run a probit model with random effects clustered around countries. Before we 
interpret the results of our analytical model, we provide some descriptive evidence. 
 
Findings 
Table 3 summarizes the data according to government partisanship and country size. It 
shows the total number of tax increases and decreases as well as the average changes 
per year calculated by the years a left- and right-wing government was in office.  
 
Table 3: Corporate Tax Decisions by Government Partisanship and Country Size 
Country Size Large/Left Large/Right Small/Left Small/Right 
Corporate tax increases 
    Number of increases 43 21 6 9 
Changes per year by left/right-
wing governments in office 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Corporate tax decreases 
    Number of decreases 67 72 28 31 
Changes per year by left/right-
wing governments in office 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 
 
First, left governments always implement more tax policy changes. This is in line with 
the view that they are more interventionist than their right-wing counterparts. Second, 
governments in large countries implement more changes than those in the smaller 
countries. This is not surprising given their more and more heterogeneous population 
which requires more tax policy adjustments in general. Third, a look at the combined 
partisan-size variation highlights that left-wing governments in the four large countries 
have adopted most corporate tax increases and decreases. They conducted on average 
0.5 increases and 0.7 decreases per year. However, the difference to the right-wing 
governments in their own countries and the left- and right-wing governments of the 
small countries is only pronounced for corporate tax increases (rather than decreases). 
The other three governments raised the tax on average merely 0.2 and 0.1 times per 
year but cut the corporate tax on average 0.6 and 0.4 times. In other words, the findings 
show that left-wing and large governments tend to do more increases and decreases. 
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However, only left-wing governments raise substantially more corporate taxes. Yet, 
there is no difference in partisan politics when it comes to tax decreases. This is in line 
with our analysis below. 
 
Table 4: Probit Results for Corporate Tax Increases and Decreases 
 Increases Decreases 
 Without 
Interaction 
Full Model Without 
Interaction 
Full Model 
     
Left Dummy 0.51*** -1.28 -0.35* -1.48 
 (0.19) (2.32) (0.21) (2.58) 
Log. Population 0.11 0.053 0.073 0.038 
 (0.068) (0.096) (0.10) (0.13) 
Interaction  0.11  0.065 
  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Debt 0.0056 0.0052 -0.0046 -0.0047 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Unemployment 0.021 0.020 0.061 0.062 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) 
Growth 0.026 0.026 -0.011 -0.0096 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) 
Observations 217 217 217 217 
Countries 8 8 8 8 
Constant not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This asymmetric effect also becomes apparent once we turn to our regression analysis. 
Table 4 shows our separate results for corporate tax increases and decreases. For each 
type we have run the regression first without and then with the interaction effect. The 
models without the interaction effect show the typical result from the literature: left 
governments are more likely to increase corporate taxes and less likely to decrease 
them. This effect seemingly vanishes, once we include the interaction term. To interpret 
the effect of left parties depending on country size we have run simulations for each 
model. The results are presented in figure 3 and 4. 
Figure 3 and 4 support the descriptive finding that left-wing governments of large 
countries are more likely to raise corporate taxes. It illustrates that the effect of 
government partisanship differs according to country size. Controlling for a number of 
variables, left-wing governments in large countries have a significant effect on corporate 
tax increases. Think, for instance, of Francois Hollande’s bid during the French 
Presidential elections 2012 to shift the tax burden from small business to large 
corporations (Hollande 2012, Point 6 of Hollande's presidential program).  
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Figure 3: Simulated Effect of Left-wing Governments on Corporate Tax Increases 





Figure 4: Simulated Effect of Left-wing Governments on Corporate Tax Decreases 






Partisanship in smaller countries, in contrast, has no effect on increases of the corporate 
tax rate. This is reflected in the statement of the Irish Labour Party, which has been a 
staunch supporter of low Irish corporate taxation: “Labour in government introduced 
the 12.5 percent corporation profits tax, and we will insist that it remains in place” 
(Labour 2011, 15). Interestingly, left governments in larger countries only conduct a 
significantly different corporate tax policy than their right-wing counterparts when it 
comes to increases, but not for tax decreases as figure 4 reveals. Here, the asymmetric 
effect of size on partisanship is not significant. Left parties seem to be slightly less likely 
to decrease corporate taxes than their right counterparts, but insignificantly so and – 
more importantly - independent of country size. This might be due to the general 
downwards trend in corporate taxation.  
In general, our findings are - at least for tax increases - in line with our theoretical model 
and show that left-wing governments of large countries tend to conduct a tax policy, 
which is more progressive than the one of their small left neighbors, where not only the 
rich but also the poor gain by receiving a higher net income from engaging in 
international tax competition and thus support it. In large democracies, the median 
voter loses from tax competition because the negative effect of less redistribution from a 
shrinking domestic capital tax base is compounded by the economic disadvantages of 
capital outflows: depressed labor demand, stagnating wages, shrinking revenues. These 
negative effects create an incentive for governments to go slow on tax competition and 
restrict capital tax cuts. An example outside the traditional OECD group is the decision of 
Mexico’s left-leaning government in 2013 to suspend the mild corporate tax cuts 
adopted by its conservative predecessor and to increase other capital taxes to 
consolidate the budget (Day 2013). Left parties in smaller countries such as Ireland or 
Denmark on the other hand agree with there conservative counterparts on the 
countries’ low corporate tax strategy. Tellingly, all initiatives to reign in “harmful” tax 
competition in Europe and worldwide have come from large countries such as Germany, 
France, the UK and most importantly the United States (Genschel and Schwarz 2011, 
359-363).  
Implications for domestic and international inequality 
Given our theoretical and empirical results, what can we learn about the real winners 
and losers from international tax competition? Do the inequality implications hold and 
can we find the predicted differences as regards domestic and international inequality 
over time (see Table 2)? A descriptive glance supports the results of our theory.  
Figure 5 depicts the gini coefficients for 22 OECD countries from 1980 to today. We can 
see the well-known increase of inequality in developed democracies. Yet, this 
development is not the same across all member states. Whereas the dotted line shows 
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the unweighted average and thus implies a modest increase in inequality by three 
points, the finding changes once we control for population size.  
 
Figure 5: Development of Post-Market Ginis in the OECD, 1980 to 2011
 
Weighted by inhabitants, thus giving increases in inequality in the United States or 
Germany more weight than increases in Luxembourg or Switzerland, the overall 
inequality within developed democracies has increased much more, namely by almost 
eight points. This is in line with our model, which predicts more modest increases in 
inequality for smaller countries.  
Yet what about international inequality? Do small states manage to beggar their bigger 
neighbors? In our model, both states had the same income endowment to start with. 
This of course does not apply to reality. Whereas some small states such as Switzerland 
have been wealthy for quite some decades, Ireland once was the poor man of Europe. 
The same applies for larger countries. Thus, we measure the development of 
international inequality more indirectly and look at growth rates. Figure 6 illustrates 
that - with the exception of the financial crisis – growth rates in the OECD move around 
three percent. Both larger and smaller countries follow similar business cycles. What has 
changed, however, is that growth rates in smaller countries (unweigthed average, dotted 
line) have since the mid1990s until the crisis been constantly higher than the ones in 
their larger counterparts. Thus, not only has the majority of people (i.e. the poor in the 




Figure 6: Development of Growth Rates in the OECD, 1980 to 2011 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our findings illustrate who the main losers of tax competition are: poor people in large 
countries. In a theoretical model which includes two countries (big and small), two 
classes (rich and poor), and two types of income (capital and labor) this is the only 
group, who does not potentially gain from tax competition. Interestingly, and contrary to 
the expectations of many, the poor of the small country, who are in pursuit of a higher 
net income, are a major driver of international tax competition. By undercutting the 
large country’s tax rate, the small country achieves an inflow of capital, which increases 
the tax base. Moreover, the inflow of capital also fuels labor demand, leads to more 
employment, higher wages and, eventually, to higher tax revenues from labor and 
consumption. In this way, not only capital profits from tax competition but labor as well 
– in the small country. This explains why many left-wing parties around the world, are in 
favor of competitive tax cuts. They cater to their supporters by lowering the capital 
taxes. By contrast, the large country cannot attract a sufficiently high amount of foreign 
capital from the small country to benefit from tax competition. Hence, the left-wing 
parties in larger states favor higher capital taxes, which can be used for domestic 
redistribution towards their poorer constituency. 
Our empirical findings provide initial support for the theoretical prediction of our 
model. The data confirms that structural conditions shape political preferences: party 
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politics matters in time of globalization, however, only in large countries. Here, the left-
right cleavage influences the corporate tax decisions of governments. Based on an 
analysis of the corporate tax choices of eight countries from 1960 to 2011, our findings 
indicate that left-wing governments of large countries adopt more capital tax increases 
then their right-wing counterparts. Although left-wing and large governments tend to 
adopt both, more increases and decreases, only left-wing governments of large countries 
raise substantially more corporate taxes. Yet this cannot stop the growing trend towards 
more national and international inequality: poorer voters in large countries loose 
relative to their own richer fellow citizens as well as to the citizens of smaller countries.  
Our model and our analytics show that we need to take asymmetric tax competition 
seriously: as long as countries differ enough in size, the citizens of small states, including 
the poor, can actually gain from tax competition – not just relative, but absolutely. This 
structural difference also shapes institutional and political answers within countries: it 
is the left and right alike in small countries, and not just the ‘the richest 1%’ (LeftUnity 
NA) that drive international tax competition. This of course has important implications 
for any serious attempts to reign in international tax competition via international 
cooperation – be it within the European Union or across a wider spectrum of OECD and 
partner countries. As long as the median voter in small countries cares more about her 
own income gains rather than about national or even international equality, the workers 
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